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THE ILLINOIS GOVERNMENTAL ETHICS ACT-
A NEED FOR STRONGER REFORM
In 1967 the Illinois General Assembly enacted the Illinois Govern-
mental Ethics Act.1 For the first time Illinois legislators provided the
state with an instrument aimed at ridding government of dishonest and
corrupt public officials. However, since its passage the Act has come un-
der severe criticism from the press, legislators and other interest groups.2
It now appears that the Act has done little to fulfill its primary objective,
that of providing the public with adequate information concerning pos-
sible financial conflicts of interest among officeholders.
The need for a potent and workable ethics act has been felt on the
national level as well as on the state level.8 As a result of several well-
publicized scandals in the mid-sixties, 4 both the United States Senate and
1. The Illinois Governmental Ethics Act, as amended, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127,
§ 601-101 et seq. (1971).
2. In 1973, the Better Government Association and the Chicago Sun-Times
investigated charges made by many of the ethics law's critics that the act- is iot
functioning in the manner intended. Further, Representative Joseph R. Lundy
(D-Evanston) and Senator John B. Roe (R-Rochelle) criticized the law as a weak
beginning toward ethics reform in Illinois and proposed bills which would tighten
the present act. See Chicago Sun-Times, June 4, 1973, at 5, col. 1.
3. Twenty-four states now have ethics laws. See N.Y. PuB. OFFICERS LAW
§ 73-80 (McKinney 1970); HAWAII REV. STAT. H§ 84-1 to 84-37 (1971);
PENN. STAT. ANN. tit. 46 H§ 143.1-143.8 (1969); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. H9
42.21.010-42.21.090 (1969); VA. CODE ANN. H9 2.1-347 to 2.1-358 (1972); W. VA.
CODE ANN. H9 6B-1-1 to 6B-1-3 (1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. H9 5-12-1 to 5-12-15
(1971); NEB. REV. STAT. H§ 49-1101 to 49-1117 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. H9
105.450-105.495 (1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. H9 75-4301 to 75-4316 (1972); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 127, H9 601-101 et seq. (1972); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1291
to 41-1297 (1972); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-3001 to 12-3008 (1971); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 1-66 to 1-78 (1972); FLA. STAT. ANN. H9 112.311 et seq. (1972);
GA. CODE § 89-925 (1972); IOWA CODE ANN. H9 68B.1-68B.10 (1973); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 42:1101-42:1148 (1972); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 17, § 3104
(1972); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A, H§ 1-24 (1970); MICH. COMP. LAws
ANN. H§ 15.301 et seq. (1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.87-3.92 (1973); N.J. STAT.
ANN. 52:13D-23 (1972).
4. In 1963, Senate Majority Secretary Bobby Baker was investigated on charges
of misuse of public office. See SENATE COMM. ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION,
FINANCIAL OR BUSINESS INTERESTS OF OFFICERS OF EMPLOYEES OF THE SENATE,
S. REP. No. 1176, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1964). In 1963, Rep. Thomas F. John-
son (D-Md.) was convicted of using his office for personal financial gains. See
United States v. Johnson, 337 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1964), aff'd. 383 U.S. 169
(1966). In 1967, Senator Thomas Dodd was censured by the Senate for misuse of
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the House of Representatives passed ethics codes designed to thwart cor-
ruption by requiring limited disclosure of financial interests.5 In response,
an executive order,0 Civil Service regulations7 and other codes were
amended to establish guidelines by which federal employees may be cau-
tioned as to governmental improprieties. Although much has been ac-
complished to combat solicitation, graft and bribery,8 national concern
has lately focused on the more covert, but equally pervasive, area of leg-
islative conflicts of interest.9
Usually the term "conflict of interest" refers to a situation in which
one's official responsibilities overlap with one's own financial interests. 10
One of the primary sources for conflicts of interest has been the realiza-
tion that effective campaigning for public office requires substantial con-
tributions from outside sources." However, it is not these contributions
themselves that lead to difficulties; rather, it is the benefits which the
donors may seek to obtain as a quid pro quo. Furthermore, an increas-
ing number of citizens who hold public office find it necessary to supple-
ment their income by engaging in outside activities.' 2 This may not cre-
ate conflicts of interest, but the possibility of influencing legislators
political funds. See 113 CONG. REC. 15,695 (1967). Also in 1967, Rep. Adam
Clayton Powell was censured, fined $40,000 and denied seniority for misuse of his
office. See HOUSE SELECT COMM. PURSUANT To H.REs. 1, IN RE ADAM CLAYTON
POWELL, H.R. REP. No. 27, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1967).
5. Rule XI and Rules XLIII-XLIV of the House of Representatives (adopted
April 3, 1968), and Rules XLI-XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate (adopted
March 22, 1968).
6. Exec. Order No. 11,222, 3 C.F.R. 160 (1973).
7. CIVIL SERVICE COMM., EMPLOYEE RESPONSIBILITIES AND CONDUCT, 5 C.F.R.
§ 735 (1973).
8. A series of laws makes it a federal crime for members of Congress to engage
in certain actions. Such prohibited acts include: soliciting or receiving anything of
value for himself or because of any official act performed or to be performed by
him, 18 U.S.C. 201g (1970); soliciting or receiving a bribe for the performance of
an official act, 18 U.S.C. 201c (1970); soliciting or receiving any compensation for
services in relation to any proceeding, contract, claim or controversy in which the
United States is a party, 18 U.S.C. 203a (1970); and entering into or benefiting
from contracts with the United States or any agency thereof, 18 U.S.C. 431
(1970). See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY SERVICE, GUIDE TO THE CONGRESS OF
THE UNITED STATES 630 (1972).
9. Note, The Illinois Governmental Ethics Act-A Step Ahead Toward Better
Government, 22 DEPAUL L. REV. 302, 304 (1972).
10. Id., at 305.
11. See Note, Illinois Campaign Finance Disclosure, 23 DEPAUL L. REV. 546
(1973).
12. See R. GETZ, CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS: THE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST ISSUE
3 (1966).
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through gifts, compensation, or "investment" opportunities is greatly in-
creased.13 Since we are unwilling to curtail private funding of elections,
adequate devices are needed to detect when these possibilities become
abuses of the public confidence.' 4 Such abuses have occurred in Illinois
government for many years,' 5 and they will continue to exist unless more
rigid penalties are placed upon such activities.
At the time of its passage, the Illinois Governmental Ethics Act'" was
considered the most comprehensive and most effective ethics legislation in
the nation. 17 The Act presently consists of a section restricting some ac-
tivities for legislators, a code of conduct for legislators and a section out-
lining the procedures necessary for filing a disclosure of economic inter-
ests. It is in this area of disclosure of economic interests' 8 that most
of the criticism has evolved.
The financial disclosure provision requires economic disclosure by mem-
bers of the legislature, persons holding elected office in the executive
branch of state government, members of any constitutional commission
or board, office holders in the judicial branch, government employees re-
ceiving $20,000 salary per year or more, appointed or elected members
of the school districts, zoning boards or other governmental boards or
commissions and candidates for nomination or election to any of these of-
fices.' 9 Additionally, the Act specifies that anyone qualifying under one
of the above categories must file a financial statement consisting of the
office holder's "economic interests" and the interests of his spouse and
children, "if constructively controlled by that person. '20 The most prob-
lem-prone section of the Act concerns the "economic interests" to be dis-
closed and the extent to which these interests must be disclosed.
The weakest provision in the legislation is the section which requires
that one indicate only the type of practice which one engages in if his to-
13. Supra note 9, at 305.
14. In 1970, a Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
published a study of Congressional Ethics. The report made major recommenda-
tions in the areas of: Conflicts of Interest; Law Practice; Campaign Financing;
Salaries and Allowances; and Gifts, Supplemental Funds and Honoraria. See
KIRBY, CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIc TRUST (1970).
15. See Conflicts of Interest Laws Commission, Ethical Standards in Ill. State
Gov't. 16-29 (Springfield: The Commission, 1967).
16. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, §§ 601-101 et seq. (1971).
17. Supra note 9, at 308, 315.
18. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, §§ 604A-101 to 604A-107 (Supp. 1972).
19. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, §§ 604A-101(a)-(i) (Supp. 1972).
20. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 604A-102 (Supp. 1972).
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tal income in a year exceeds $1,200 from that practice and that one need
report only the commercial nature of a client if the fees from that client
exceed $5,000 within that year.2 ' Critics of the Act have argued that
by complying with this section lawyers may be violating their obligation
of confidentiality to their clients. However, there is no provision in the
Ethics Act which requires a lawyer to disclose the names of clients or the
exact amount of fees received from them, thus disposing of the confi-
dentiality objection.
A workable disclosure law should require disclosure of any corpora-
tion, financial institution, or other organization or individual from whom
a legislator may have received compensation, gifts, or other gratuities.
Additionally, the "over $5,000" fee requirement should be drastically
lowered in order to include those fees which may have resulted from a
conflict of interest, but which need not be disclosed now, because they
are under $5,000.22 Such revisions in the present Act would, in effect,
require full disclosure of all financial interests.
Such disclosure would be meaningless, however, without rigid en-
forcement. At the present time, the filing of a false or incomplete state-
ment subjects the public official to either imprisonment, not to exceed one
year, or a fine not to exceed $1,000, or both. 23 Initially, Illinois legisla-
tors neglected to include penalties for failure to file the financial state-
ment. The only punitive measure available is a provision in the Illinois
Constitution, which maintains that failure to file by the legal deadline
shall result in ineligibility for, or forfeiture of, office. 24  Recently, how-
ever, the legislature amended the Ethics Act to include penalties for
failure to file the financial interests statement. 25  The section is similar
to its constitutional counterpart in that it also states that failure to file
the statement will result in ineligibility for, or forfeiture of, office,26 but
it also includes the possibility of prosecution for official misconduct for
21. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, §§ 604A-102(a)(1), (2), (3) (Supp. 1972).
22. Recently, U.S. Senator Adlai E. Stevenson III (D-Ill.) sponsored a financial
disclosure bill for congressmen that might serve as a model for ethics reform legis-
lation in Illinois. Senator Stevenson's bill would require disclosure of: the amount
and source of each item of income, reimbursement and gift over $100; the value of
each asset worth more than $5,000; and full and complete details of any business
transactions made by or for an official if the aggregate amount involved exceeds
$5,000. Chicago Sun-Times, June 4, 1973, at 40, col. 1.
23. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 604A-107 (Supp. 1973).
24. ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 2.
25. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 604A-107 (Supp. 1973).
26. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 604A-107 (Supp. 1973).
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those who intentionally or unintentionally fail to file. 27
This new section has become another area of controversy, for the Act
fails to provide a method of notifying candidates and office holders that
they must file statements. As a result, scores of state and local officials
who filed late or who failed to file faced possible removal from office. 3
In order to prevent this, the legislature passed a bill which grants to the
officials added time to submit their statements.2 9  The retroactive effect
of the measure has been criticized on the grounds that it violates the Con-
stitution's equal protection and due process clauses. More specifically,
the financial disclosure section of the Ethics Act has been attacked on
constitutional grounds as an invasion of privacy.
The first case in which the constitutionality of the Ethics Act was
tested before the Illinois Supreme Court was Stein v. Howlett.30 In that
case a taxpayer brought suit to enjoin the expenditure of public funds in
order to enforce the Illinois Governmental Ethics Act. He challenged
the constitutionality of the Act on the grounds that it was an unconstitu-
tional invasion of privacy, that it unduly restricted the right to hold office
and that it was overbroad and unconstitutionally vague.8 ' It was further
argued that the law was ex post facto since, under the provisions of this
Act, public officials who were elected prior to July 1, 1972, are required
to meet qualifications which did not exist when they assumed office.32
However, the supreme court rejected those constitutional claims.
In its decision the court stated that "one purpose of the Act was to
disclose any abuse of office and to instill in the public, trust and confi-
dence in its government and officials."'33 The court went on to hold that
the statute was not overbroad as an unconstitutional invasion of privacy,
and responded that it would be inconsistent with the purpose of the Act
to permit an office holder to decide when a financial interest does or does
27. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 604A-107 (Supp. 1973).
28. Supra note 2, at 40, col. 2.
29. The Act provides for a 30-day extension of the filing period for persons
who, within 10 days before or after the final filing date, file a declaration of in-
tention to defer the filing of such statement. It further provides for a 30-day grace
period after the effective date of this amendatory act for the filing of statements of
economic interests which were due before that date. See ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 127,
§ 604A-105 (Supp. 1972). However, the legislature has also extended the statute
of limitations from 18 months to 3 years on prosecutions of violations of the Act.
See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 604A-107 (Supp. 1973).
30. 52 I11. 2d 570, 289 N.E.2d 409 (1972).
31. Id. at 573, 289 N.E.2d at 411.
32. Id. at 574, 289 N.E.2d at 411.
33. Id. at 578, 289 N.E.2d at 413.
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not relate to his public employment. As to the question of unconstitu-
tionally restricting the right to seek and hold office, the court merely
found that since the Illinois Constitution required such disclosure the sec-
tion should be upheld. Finally, the court quickly dismissed the ex post
facto defense by maintaining that it is appropriate only where criminal
sanctions are imposed. Although the supreme court held the Illinois
Governmental Ethics Act constitutional in Stein v. Howlett, the Act has
once again come under constitutional attack in Illinois v. Kennedy.3 4
In Kennedy the court ruled unconstitutional that portion of the Ethics
Act which requires financial disclosure by public officials. The decision,
in effect, prohibits the state from requiring any office holder in Will
County to file an ethics statement, thereby diluting the Ethics Act which
had been ruled constitutional35 only a year earlier. The court maintained
that the requirement that candidates file statements of economic interest
at the time they file to run for public office was unreasonable, discrim-
inatory and violative of due process and of the civil rights of the can-
didate. 36 Although the court ruled that only the section of the Act which
stipulates the time at which a statement must be submitted is unconstitu-
tional, the effect of the ruling is that statements may not be required of
candidates or officials in Will County. Following his ruling, the judge
stated that it was "not in the public interest to declare elected officials out
of office just because they failed to file this statement when the law says
they had to. '" 37  He felt that the cost of holding a new election would
override the public interest involved in fniancial disclosure. Regardless
of the reasoning used in the decision, the fact remains that it has put
more pressure upon the legislators to amend the current act so as to sat-
isfy the public and the office holder or potential candidate.
In response to this pressure, legislators acknowledged a need for im-
mediate action by the legislature. Consequently, Illinois Governor Dan-
iel Walker;3 8 and members of the Illinois House 9 and Senate 40 submitted
34. On September 10, 1973, a Will County Circuit Court granted summary judg-
ments to seventy-five defendants who had failed to file financial disclosure state-
ments as required by law. The court, in effect, held that the financial disclosure
section of the Illinois Governmental Ethics Act was unconstitutional. Illinois v.
Kennedy, No. W736-1275-MR (Circuit Court of Will County, Sept. 10, 1973).
35. Stein v. Howlett, 52 I11. 2d 570, 289 N.E.2d 409 (1972).
36. Illinois v. Kennedy, No. W 736-1275-MR (Circuit Court of Will County,
Sept. 10, 1973).
37. Illinois State Journal, September 11, 1973, at 1, col. 3.
38. On October 15, 1973, Representative Arthur S. Berman (D-Chicago) in-
troduced an Open Campaigns and Honest Government Act on behalf of Governor
Daniel Walker, providing for disclosure of campaign contributions and expendi-
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various proposals to a special session of the Illinois General Assembly in
October, 1973,41 aimed at tightening the Ethics Act. Although the pro-
posals confront some of the problems in government, such as campaign
contribution disclosure, financial disclosures of economic interests and es-
tablishment of a nonpartisan administering board of ethics, there is still
hesitation among legislators to enact stronger measures which would re-
move any thought of impropriety among government officials. Whether
this hesitation is the result of a fear of self-incrimination or the result of
a true belief that strict financial disclosure is an unconstitutional invasion
of privacy is a matter about which only the public can make a final de-
termination. As stated in Stein v. Howlett, the Illinois Governmental Eth-
ics Act "reflects the compelling governmental interest which is paramount
to the rights of the individual"42 public employee. Therefore, it is not
for the public employee "to decide when a financial interest relates to his
public employment. ' 43 Rather it is for the public to scrutinize public of-
ficials through the use of effective financial disclosure of all necessary
information. "Necessary information" would include any financial in-
formation concerning that official person's activities, such that an honest
determination may be made as to whether a conflict of interest exists.
tures, and strengthening the present law requiring public officials to disclose their
economic interests. The proposals include: full disclosure of campaign contribu-
tions to all state and county candidates and their committees; disclosure of personal
finances and economic interests by all elected state officers, their appointees, and
state employees who earn $20,000 a year or more; a jail penalty upon conviction for
failure to properly make disclosures; and a five-member bipartisan elections board,
appointed by the Governor, confirmed by the Senate, and with subpoena powers
to investigate violations of the Ethics Act. House Bill 10 of the first Special
Session was introduced into the Illinois General Assembly on October 15, 1973.
However, on November 15, 1973, the Illinois House rejected the Governor's pro-
gram, charging it with being too broad and sweeping.
39. Representative Henry Hyde (R-Park Ridge) introduced an amendment to
the present Ethics Act which would add a new paiagraph, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127,
§§ 606A-101, authorizing the establishment of a Board of Ethics composed of
deans of the various Illinois law schools. House Bill 20 of the First Special Session
introduced into the Illinois General Assembly on October 29, 1973.
40. On November 15, 1973, the Illinois Senate approved two bills. One was
introduced by Senator John B. Roe (R-Rochelle) which establishes an eleven-
member state ethics commission. S.B. 8 (S.S. 1), 78th Ill. Gen. Assembly (1973)
(introduced October 29, 1973). Another bill introduced by Senate President
William C. Harris (R-Pontiac) requires campaign disclosures to the State Board
of Ethics. such disclosures being made public only if any contribution exceeds $150.
S.B. 12 (S.S. 1), 78th Ill. Gen. Assembly (1973) (introduced October 29, 1973).
41. On October 15, 1973, Illinois Governor Daniel Walker called a special ses-
sion of the Illinois General Assembly to confront the problems of campaign con-
tributions and economic disclosure.
42. 52 Ill. 2d 570, 578, 289 N.E.2d 409, 413 (1972).
43. Id.
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While politicians recognize the importance of enacting ethics reform
legislation as a means of restoring public confidence in the political proc-
ess, the present proposals have been shelved by the Illinois legislature
until the 1974 session as a subject which is too politically sensitive. 44
This delay should be tolerated by the electorate only if founded upon a
genuine concern that thoughtful and effective-not merely cosmetic-
measures are enacted.
Nicholas Esposito
44. See Chicago Tribune, November 29, 1973, § 3, at 14, col. 1.
